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Arbitrary Disproportionality: A New
Charter Standard for Measuring the
Constitutionality of Mandatory
Minimum Sentences
Allan Manson
I. INTRODUCTION
The scope of mandatory minimum sentences for various offences
continues to grow in Canada. Yet, challenges to their constitutionality
using section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 the
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment or treatment, have
almost consistently failed. While this trend may have changed direction
with the decision in R. v. Smickle,2 discussed below, it is too soon for
complacency. Distracted by the methodological problems of reasonable
hypotheticals and constitutional exemptions, “cruel and unusual”
jurisprudence has been distilled around the notion of gross disproportionality tied to the limited standard of outraging “standards of decency”.
As a result, the discourse around section 12 has been truncated and has
lost the potential richness that the various opinions in the seminal case of
R. v. Smith3 seemed to portend at the time. If the section 12 jurisprudence
remains stuck in that narrow analytical mold, there is little reason to
think that it will provide a useful tool for scrutinizing mandatory minimum sentences.
In this paper I want to develop the argument that the concept of arbitrariness can play a central role in assessing the constitutionality of
sentencing legislation. First, if we go back to Smith, as Justice Malloy
did in Smickle,4 we will find dimensions within the “cruel and unusual”


Faculty of Law, Queen’s University.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
2
[2012] O.J. No. 612, 280 C.C.C. (3d) 365 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Smickle”].
3
[1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”].
4
Supra, note 2.
1
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debate which have particular resonance to the issue of mandatory
minimum sentences and may be more analytically useful than the
outraging “standards of decency” test. One concept is arbitrariness.
Second, if there seems to be no room to re-instate arbitrariness into
section 12 jurisprudence, the same concept has made headway in recent
section 7 cases dealing with a variety of public law issues. Ultimately, I
argue that the constitutional validity of mandatory minimum sentences
should be based on a new, carefully tailored standard, which might be
called arbitrary disproportionality.

II. THE SUPREME COURT GETS DISTRACTED
While the basic test of “gross disproportionality” has remained in
place, the Supreme Court of Canada has adopted a very high standard for
a section 12 declaration of invalidity, the outraging “standards of decency” test. However, we have not arrived at this place by thoughtful
reflection on the purposes and scope of section 12 and the “cruel and
unusual” concept. Instead, we are here essentially by default. Look, for
example, at the concept of equality which had its genesis in the creative
analysis offered in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,5 but then
developed through a series of cases which built on the evolving appreciation of the purposes and effects of section 15, and its practical implementation as a robust constitutional norm.6 Instead, section 12 cases did not
build on the various Smith opinions, but concentrated on methodological
issues to the detriment of the potential richness of the “cruel and unusual” concept. When dealing with section 12, the majority of the
Supreme Court has acted like a couple who sits down to plan next
summer’s driving trip. Rather than focusing on where they could go, they
debate the merits of renting a vehicle over using the family car. By the
time the summer comes, they have become so embroiled in the vehicular
issue that they have not explored the raft of available directions and
interesting destinations. Alas, they make the perfunctory decision to
drive down the 401 Highway to their usual spot, Montreal — a good
choice, but a simple choice. The vehicle issue distracted them from the
5

[1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.).
See Miron v. Trudel, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (S.C.C.); Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.); Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No.
42, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.); Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999]
S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.); R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483
(S.C.C.); Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.).
6
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more intriguing, albeit complex, alternatives. So it has been with the
Supreme Court, or at least most of its judges, in the cases of R. v. Goltz,7
R. v. Morrisey8 and R. v. Ferguson.9 Thinking too much about how to get
there, they deprived themselves of the opportunities to think about where
they wanted to go.
The majority decisions in Goltz and Morrisey became mired in the
question of what is a “reasonable hypothetical”, even though this issue
did not flow directly from the earlier Supreme Court decision in Smith.10
The majority of judges in Smith held that Edward Dewey Smith had
standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 5(2) of the Narcotic
Control Act11 which imposed a minimum seven-year sentence for
importing narcotics. Mr. Smith had returned to Canada from South
America with “seven and a half ounces of 85 to 90 per cent pure cocaine
secreted on his person”.12 The trial judge found the impugned seven-year
minimum sentence to be unconstitutional given the potential disproportionality of the mandatory sentence in light of “the range of offences, the
variety of ways the offence may be committed, and the great disparity of
the sentence with that imposed on others who have committed offences
identical in gravity and nature”.13 With his sentencing discretion freed
from the mandatory minimum, he then sentenced Mr. Smith to eight
years imprisonment. Clearly, the particular circumstances of Mr. Smith
and his offence did not support a “cruel and unusual” claim. By giving
Mr. Smith standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 5(2), the
majority of the Supreme Court held that the case could be argued by
reference to the range of conduct which section 5(2) encompassed. While
hypothetical examples were used to support the reasoning, the majority
did not introduce the concept of a reasonable hypothetical as the requisite
platform for a section 12 challenge not based on the particular circumstances of the litigant.
Looking specifically at Smith and the issue of standing, we should
remember that we are examining the very early years of Charter jurisprudence when the Supreme Court was understandably confronted by a
number of important and difficult interpretive, definitional, methodologi7
8
9
10
11
12
13

[1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Goltz”].
[2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morrisey”].
[2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ferguson”].
Supra, note 3.
R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1.
Supra, note 3, at para. 6.
Id., at para. 16.
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cal and procedural Charter issues. Less than ten months before Smith was
argued, the Supreme Court released its decision in R. v. Big M Drug Mart
Ltd.14 which held that a corporation could challenge the constitutionality
of a legislative provision on the basis that it violated the Charter’s
guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion. In so doing, Dickson
C.J.C. stated:
Any accused, whether corporate or individual, may defend a
criminal charge by arguing that the law under which the charge is
brought is constitutionally invalid. Big M is urging that the law under
which it has been charged is inconsistent with s. 2(a) of the Charter and
by reason of s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, it is of no force or
effect.
Whether a corporation can enjoy or exercise freedom of religion is
therefore irrelevant. The respondent is arguing that the legislation is
constitutionally invalid because it impairs freedom of religion — if the
law impairs freedom of religion it does not matter whether the company
can possess religious belief. An accused atheist would be equally
entitled to resist a charge under the Act.15

In other words, an arguable case of constitutional infirmity can be raised
by a party even if the party’s own factual situation does not support the
claim.
The Smith Court included Dickson C.J.C. and three other justices
who sat on Big M. In Smith, the dissenting opinion of McIntyre J.
expressed great concern about Smith’s standing to argue unconstitutionality. In observing that “there is an air of unreality about this appeal”,16
he characterized the claim in these terms:
... the imposition of “a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years”
on a hypothetical “first time importer of a single marijuana cigarette”
would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In effect, the appellant
is stating that while the law is not unconstitutional in its application to
him, it may be unconstitutional in its application to a third party and,
therefore, should be declared of no force or effect [because the question
of cruel and unusual punishment, under s. 12 of the Charter, does not
appear to arise on the facts of the case]”.17

14
15
16
17

[1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.).
Id., at paras. 39-40.
Supra, note 3, at para. 78.
Id.
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Justice McIntyre concluded that this was not a sound approach to section
12 litigation which should be restricted to cases where the punishment in
question is arguably “cruel and unusual” and not extended to a claim
based on “some hypothetical third party”.18 Curiously, this dissenting
view became the genesis of the “reasonable hypothetical” debate that
arose in subsequent cases.
It is important to note that McIntyre J. did recognize the utility of
permitting a challenge to laws even if the claimant’s own rights are not
affected in situations where leaving a matter unresolved cast a “chilling
effect” on legal activities.19 In essence, he was saying that there is a
public interest in permitting expeditious litigation especially where
people actually affected may not easily be able to litigate. Using the
threshold of impact on legal activities may seem appealing but it is
misleading. There are other relevant pubic interest values which may
come into play. Importantly, Lamer J., for the majority, rejected the
Crown’s claim that prosecutorial discretion kept inappropriate cases
away from the mandatory minimum but added his concern that the
mandatory minimum sentence “gives the Crown an unfair advantage in
plea bargaining as an accused will be more likely to plead guilty to a
lesser or included offence”.20 In an era in which we are now familiar with
the reality of wrongful convictions, we cannot dismiss the prospect that
some innocent people, during the seven-year minimum sentence regime
for importing, may have been induced to plead guilty to “possession for
the purposes” with a short jail sentence to avoid the risk of an importing
conviction and the mandatory minimum sentence. Accordingly, permitting expeditious litigation challenging a mandatory minimum sentence
promotes justice and fairness values akin to McIntyre J.’s “chilling
effect” argument.21 Put in this context, perhaps even McIntyre J. would
have re-thought his opposition.
When we look at the majority judgment in Smith, we see that the
methodological decision to permit the claim to go forward was based on
the finding that “it is inevitable that, in some cases, a verdict of guilt will
lead to the imposition of a term of imprisonment which will be grossly
disproportionate”.22 As Lamer J. succinctly said: it is “the certainty, not
18
19
20
21

120.

22

Id., at para. 78.
Id., at para. 79.
Id., at para. 72.
This was essentially Le Dain J.’s position on the question of standing: see id., at para.
Id., at para. 65.
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just the potential”.23 Clearly, the majority was looking at the range of
conduct and culpability encompassed by the offence in question given
the myriad ways in which it could be committed. This was not an
exercise in imagination but a recognition of the breadth of the offence of
importing a narcotic combined with the “certainty” that a seven-year
sentence would be grossly disproportionate, in circumstances included in
the scope of the offence, to the culpability and circumstances of the
offender. This is not a conclusion based on a reasonable hypothetical.
It was only in Goltz where the Supreme Court deviated from this approach by focusing on the permissible use of the “reasonable hypothetical”. Recognizing that Smith mandated a section 12 methodology which
could extend beyond the facts of the claimant’s case, Gonthier J. observed:
The question is not greeted by an immediate or obvious answer. The
jurisprudence to date exhibits significant confusion about the use of
hypothetical examples which may readily demonstrate that in some
imaginable circumstances a minimum penalty might result in a
punishment whose effects are grossly or excessively disproportionate to
the particular wrongdoing in a given case.24

The reference to “confusion” was a gross exaggeration. The substantive
criminal law, including Charter standards, explains and delimits the
range of culpable conduct which can satisfy a given offence. As well,
looking to the circumstances of the offender, it is inevitable that someone
will be a young first offender. Accordingly, it was provocative hyperbole
to talk about “imaginable circumstances”. With this preamble to his
analysis, Gonthier J. concluded that, beyond the offender’s factual
context, a section 12 challenge should only proceed “on grounds of gross
disproportionality as evidenced in reasonable hypothetical circumstances, as opposed to far-fetched or marginally imaginable cases”.25 In
his words:
A reasonable hypothetical example is one which is not far-fetched or
only marginally imaginable as a live possibility. While the Court is
unavoidably required to consider factual patterns other than that
presented by the respondent’s case, this is not a licence to invalidate
statutes on the basis of remote or extreme examples. Laws typically
aim to govern a particular field generally, so that they apply to a range
23
24
25

Id., at para. 66.
Supra, note 7, at para. 38.
Id., at para. 42.
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of persons and circumstances. It is true that this Court has been
vigilant, wherever possible, to ensure that a proper factual foundation
exists before measuring legislation against the Charter (Danson v.
Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, at p. 1099, and
MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, at pp. 361-62). Yet it has
been noted above that s. 12 jurisprudence does not contemplate a
standard of review in which that kind of factual foundation is available
in every instance. The applicable standard must focus on imaginable
circumstances which could commonly arise in day-to-day life.26

In contrast, the dissenting judges, including Lamer C.J.C. and McLachlin
J. (as she then was), who both sat on Smith, would have upheld the lower
court’s decision which it characterized as “simply saying that when the
gravity of the offence is considered together with the potential range of
situations in which offenders may find themselves, a mandatory minimum sentence may prevent the court charged with sentencing from
reaching a fair result, and indeed require the judge in some cases to
impose a sentence which is grossly disproportionate.”27 The three
dissenters appreciated that Smith was based on a range of conduct and
culpability analysis and did not instruct judges and lawyers to exercise
their imaginations.
The extent of the restrictive approach to a “reasonable hypothetical”
embraced by Goltz became apparent in Morrisey28 in which the Gonthierled majority rejected the use of reported decisions as “reasonable
hypotheticals” because they do not represent circumstances “that could
commonly arise in day-to-day life”.29 Manslaughter is certainly an
offence of well-recognized breadth but it is this very breadth which made
a four-year mandatory minimum sentence open to challenge under
section 12. Instead, Gonthier J. would only consider two kinds of
hypotheticals even if they arose from a reported case:
It appears to me that there are two types of situations that commonly
arise and which can be gleaned from the reported cases. The first
involves an individual playing around with a gun. The offender
unreasonably thinks that the gun will not go off. He aims it at another
person and discharges it, killing someone. This includes playing
Russian roulette (Saswirsky, supra, and J.C., supra), and pretending to
shoot a friend to frighten him (Davis, supra, and Morehouse, supra).
26
27
28
29

Id., at para. 69.
Id., at para. 109.
Supra, note 8.
Id., at paras. 31-33.
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The second hypothetical situation that arises from the reported cases
involves a hunting trip gone awry.30

This must be read in context; Gonthier J. had already made the curious remark that a reported case might be “one of the ‘marginal’ cases, not
contemplated by the approach set out in Goltz”.31 Obviously, the “marginal case” would use its own facts to support the claim of “gross
disproportionality” and, if successful, the result would be a section 52
declaration of invalidity. So why is it that the “marginal case” cannot
support a claim by someone whose own facts do not lead to a “gross
disproportionality” conclusion? It must have been this recognition which
led the two dissenters, Arbour and McLachlin JJ., to conclude that “there
will unavoidably be a case in which a four-year minimum sentence for
this offence will be grossly disproportionate”.32 This was consistent with
the real Smith rationale based on looking at the scope of the offence, not
reasonable hypotheticals. Justice Arbour offered as a potential example a
case of unlawful act manslaughter where an abused spouse responds to
her abuser causing his death. Notwithstanding the substantive requirement that the act must convey reasonable foresight of bodily harm, it is
inevitable that there will be other mitigating circumstances which will
make the four-year mandatory minimum sentence grossly disproportionate. Justice Arbour appreciated the inadequacy of Gonthier J.’s methodology and concluded that it will make the question of constitutionality of
a punishment provision “dependent essentially on timing”:
It will be upheld until it is challenged in a “marginal” case, or at least
one that was viewed as too marginal to constitute a reasonable
hypothetical, but when that case arises, the section will be struck down
under the first branch of the test in Smith and Goltz, for the benefit,
presumably, of all subsequent cases.33

Still, in the end, both Arbour and McLachlin JJ. would have dismissed
the appeal advocating that, in future criminal negligence manslaughter
cases, the mandatory minimum would be “applicable in all cases save
those in which it would be unconstitutional to do so”.34 This sounds very
close to supporting a constitutional exemption, which leads us directly to

30
31
32
33
34

Id., at paras. 51-52.
Id., at para. 32.
Id., at para. 82.
Id., at para. 89.
Id., at para. 94.
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the last methodological case which distracted the Supreme Court’s “cruel
and unusual” attention.
In Ferguson,35 the Supreme Court unanimously held that constitutional exemptions should not be an available remedy in section 12 cases.
Courts have only two options: strike down the legislation or uphold its
constitutionality. For the Court, McLachlin C.J.C. based the rejection of
exemptions on four considerations: (1) the weight of lower court authorities; (2) the availability of a constitutional exemption contradicted
Parliament’s intention to limit sentencing discretion; (3) distinctions in
the intended remedial scope of section 24(1) and section 24(2) of the
Charter; and (4) exemptions undermine the rule of law and its intrinsic
values of certainty, accessibility, intelligibility, clarity and predictability.
Without commenting on this reasoning which was developed in detail, it
is clear that Ferguson put to rest the constitutional exemption option in
section 12 cases. However, on the “cruel and unusual” issue, the decision
in this case illustrates how arid that analysis had become:
The test for whether a particular sentence constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment is whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate:
R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045. As this Court has repeatedly held, to
be considered grossly disproportionate, the sentence must be more than
merely excessive. The sentence must be “so excessive as to outrage
standards of decency” and disproportionate to the extent that Canadians
“would find the punishment abhorrent or intolerable”: R. v. Wiles,
[2005] 3 S.C.R. 895, 2005 SCC 84, at para. 4, citing Smith, at p. 1072
and Morrisey, at para. 26.36

This is the distillation of “cruel and unusual” analysis after Goltz,
Morrisey and Ferguson. The broader dimensions of “gross disproportionailty” have been reduced to the high threshold of outraging standards
of decency and its rhetorical siblings, abhorrent or intolerable punishment or treatment. Even the intervening cases of R. v. Lyons37 and R. v.
Luxton,38 neither of which raised methodological issues, did not address
the concept of arbitrariness but restricted their analysis to the effects of
the punishment within a “rational” sentencing system. But has the
Supreme Court rejected the richness of Smith, including its discussions
of arbitrariness, or simply neglected it?
35
36
37
38

Supra, note 9.
Id., at para. 14.
[1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lyons”].
[1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Luxton”].
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III. SMITH AND THE CONCEPT OF ARBITRARINESS
Consistently, the Supreme Court has recognized the seminal nature
of the Smith decision and the depth of its historical, contextual and
comparative analysis. Accordingly, it is necessary to mine the various
opinions for those concepts or factors which may remain relevant and
worthy of attention. The judgment of Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J.,
(written by Lamer J.) was the longest and most careful of the five
opinions. It makes some important preliminary points about section 12
which have remained uncontroverted. First, the phrase “cruel and
unusual” is a “compendious expression of a norm”.39 Second, the
constitutionality analysis starts with an inquiry into the validity of the
purpose of the legislative provision but extends into the question of
whether the means chosen by Parliament have produced effects which
violate the guarantee.40 Third, the issue is whether the punishment is
“grossly disproportionate”, and not merely excessive, which can be
corrected on appeal.41 Fourth, Lamer J. adopted the basic standard
articulated by Laskin C.J.C. in the Canadian Bill of Rights42 case, R. v.
Miller:43 “whether the punishment prescribed is so excessive as to
outrage standards of decency”.44 But the opinion then moved into richer
territory when it canvassed those factors which may be relevant to that
assessment. He said:
... the determination of whether the punishment is necessary to achieve
a valid penal purpose, whether it is founded on recognized sentencing
principles, and whether there exist valid alternatives to the punishment
imposed, are all guidelines which, without being determinative in
themselves, help to assess whether the punishment is grossly
disproportionate.45

Then, he moved on to consider arbitrariness.
Although he accepted that whether a punishment was arbitrarily imposed was one of the factors which Professor Tarnopolsky (as he then
was) synthesized from various Canadian Bill of Rights cases, Lamer J.
ultimately reached the influential conclusion that arbitrariness should
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Supra, note 3, at para. 40.
Id., at paras. 48-50.
Id., at paras. 53-54.
S.C. 1960, c. 44.
[1976] S.C.J. No. 91, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680 (S.C.C.).
Smith, supra, note 3, at para. 40.
Id., at para. 57.
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only be “a minimal factor in the determination of whether a punishment
or treatment is cruel and unusual”.46 However, this observation needs to
be put in context. As was common at the time, many American constitutional cases were submitted to the court. Justice Lamer was building on
the important views that he expressed in Reference re Motor Vehicle Act
(British Columbia), s. 94(2)47 that Canadian courts should not follow
American constitutional jurisprudence when defining Charter rights. In
Smith, he extended this approach to arbitrariness:
This reference to the arbitrary nature of the punishment as a factor is a
direct import into Canada of one of the tests elaborated upon by the
American judiciary in dealing with the Eighth Amendment of their
Constitution. Although the tests developed by the Americans provide
useful guidance, they stem from the analysis of a constitution which is
different in many respects from the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.48

Here, it is important to note two things. First, Lamer J. recognized that
the American jurisprudence stemmed from death penalty cases and was
skewed by the fact that criminal law is within state jurisdiction.
Arbitrariness was a central feature in the two major U.S. death penalty cases, the first of which held the death penalty unconstitutional as
applied, due to its arbitrary imposition. In that case, Furman v. Georgia,49
the reasoning was spread diffusely over nine separate opinions in a 5-4
decision. In explaining his view, Stewart J. concluded that those selected
for execution represented “a capriciously selected random handful” out
of the eligible set.50 Accordingly, the criteria actually employed must
have been arbitrary or discriminatory. Subsequently Georgia responded
by creating aggravating criteria which could justify the death penalty.
Other states revised their statutes to provide either for mandatory
schemes or some form of “guided discretion”. In 1976, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the revised Georgia statute was constitutional since it
provided adequate guidance for a jury to determine whether there was
justification for imposing the death penalty, thus avoiding the “wanton
and freakish” application that had existed before.51 Given the proliferation of new state death penalty laws involving stipulated aggravating
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id., at para. 62.
[1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 17 (S.C.C.).
Smith, supra, note 3, at para. 60.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id., at 309-10.
Gregg v. Georgia, 462 U.S. 153 (1976), especially at 206-207.
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factors, it was inevitable that the U.S. Supreme Court would face claims
of unconstitutionality directed at specific factors. In Zant v. Stephens,52 a
unanimous Court concluded that an aggravating factor needed to perform
a “constitutionally necessary function” which has been described as
limiting “the death-eligible class to the most culpable offenders, for
whom jurors will more consistently deem death sentences to be justified”.53 While a concern about arbitrariness was at the heart of these
decisions, Lamer J. was correct that the constitutional analysis was not a
fruitful ground for our Supreme Court to follow. In American capital
cases, arbitrariness only related to the imposition of the sentence in order
to ensure equality under the law.54
Second, after explaining the distinction between the Charter and U.S.
constitutional guarantees, in Smith Lamer J. specifically commented on
arbitrariness by stating that:
As regards this factor, some comments should be made, because
arbitrariness of detention and imprisonment is addressed by s. 9, and, to
the extent that the arbitrariness, given the proper context, could be in
breach of a principle of fundamental justice, it could trigger a prima
facie violation under section 7. As indicated above, s. 12 is concerned
with the effect of a punishment, and, as such, the process by which the
punishment is imposed is not, in my respectful view, of any great
relevance to a determination under s. 12.55

These remarks show that he was addressing arbitrariness only in the
limited imposition sense but that a broader conception might be developed under section 7. As discussed later in this paper, he was prescient
although he did not foresee the potential link between legislative objectives and the effect of a punishment.
The other opinions in Smith are also informative on the issue of arbitrariness. The dissenter, McIntyre J., devoted substantial attention to
arbitrariness and Le Dain J. concurred with this part of his judgment.
Justice McIntyre accepted that there are various definitions including
52

462 U.S. 862 (1983).
See the discussion of this case in C.C. Sharon, “The ‘Most Deserving’ of Death: The
Narrowing Requirement and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing” (2011)
46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 223, at 230-32.
54
It is also important to note that American “cruel and unusual” jurisprudence has evolved
to provide an analytical framework for categorical challenges to both capital and non-capital
sentences: see, for example, Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010), in which a majority held that
it was unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile to life without parole in a non-capital case. For a useful
critique, see “The Supreme Court, 2009 Term” (2010) 124:1 Harv. L. Rev. 209-19.
55
Supra, note 3, at para. 59.
53
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“capricious”, “frivolous”, “unreasonable”, “unjustified” and “not
governed by rules or principles”.56 He accepted that arbitrariness would
be relevant to a section 12 challenge in situations where “the legislation
on its face could impose punishment in an arbitrary manner” or “a body
empowered to impose punishment could, in practice, impose the punishment arbitrarily”.57 However, he rejected entirely any inquiry into
legislative rationale. In his view, courts needed to defer to the reasoning
of Parliament and concluded:
I agree with Lambert J. [sic] in the Court of Appeal that this is not a
matter which can properly be considered by the courts. As he stated, “it
is not for the courts to consider whether political decisions are wise or
rational, or to sit in judgment on the wisdom of legislation or the
rationality of the process by which it is enacted. That is for Parliament
and the Legislatures ... The courts are confined to deciding whether the
legislation enacted by the parliamentary process is constitutional.”58

While this may have been an attractive posture for some judges in 1987,
it no longer holds water in modern Charter analysis. The wisdom of
legislation may be beyond Charter scrutiny but statutes which impose
burdens or create distinctions must conform with Charter norms.
Like Lamer J., Wilson J. also looked at arbitrariness as it related to
the imposition of the punishment but took a more expansive view of
when imposition would be arbitrary:
I disagree, however, with Lamer J. that the arbitrary nature of the
minimum sentence under s. 5(2) of the Act is irrelevant to its
designation as “cruel and unusual” under s. 12. On the contrary, I
believe it is quite fundamental. A seven-year sentence for drug
importation is not per se cruel and unusual. It may be very well
deserved and completely appropriate. It is the fact that the seven-year
sentence must be imposed regardless of the circumstances of the
offence or the circumstances of the offender that results in its being
grossly disproportionate in some cases and therefore cruel and unusual
in those particular cases. The concept of “the fit sentence” to which I
made reference in my concurring reasons in the Re B.C. Motor Vehicle
Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, as basic to modern day theories of
punishment is effectively, precluded by the mandatory minimum in
s. 5(2). Judicial discretion to impose a shorter sentence if circumstances
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warrant is foreclosed and the inevitable result is a legislatively ordained
grossly disproportionate sentence in some cases.59

This remark shows her concern that a mandatory minimum sentence may
compel an unconstitutional sentence and, accordingly, violate section 12
by producing a “legislatively ordained grossly disproportionate sentence”. Justice La Forest concurred with Lamer J. but, in a brief opinion,
indicated that he preferred “not to say anything about the role of arbitrariness in determining whether there has been cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment”.60
To summarize, in Smith, we see that McIntyre, Le Dain and Wilson
JJ. supported a robust role for arbitrariness in section 12 litigation
although their views were incipient and in need of development. Justice
La Forest expressly declined from commenting on the issue. While
Lamer J. and Dickson C.J.C. would only give arbitrariness a “minimal”
role, they were dealing with a limited conception of arbitrariness and also
remarked that a better home for the concept might be within section 7.
After Smith, the concept of arbitrariness within section 12 was dispatched by Gonthier J. in one sentence in Goltz by referring to Lamer J.’s
“minimal factor” comment.61 Consequently, the concept of arbitrariness
did not appear in Morrisey or Ferguson. So much for the potential
richness of arbitrariness as a constitutional factor within section 12.

IV. ARBITRARINESS UNDER SECTION 7
Of course, arbitrariness plays a role in the rational connection aspect
of the R. v. Oakes62 test, but this is part of the section 1 justificatory
stage. The question is whether arbitrariness can also play a role in the
Charter violation analysis, before getting to section 1. With very little
discussion, there are brief passages in Smith, Lyons and Luxton which
allude to a potential claim under section 7 that could be pursued on the
basis that the legislative provision in question did not pursue a legitimate
penological objective or, at least, did not do so rationally.63 But these
were only hints. The emergence of arbitrariness as part of the “principles
of fundamental justice” under section 7 can be traced back to R. v.
59
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Morgentaler64 and Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General),65
two cases dealing with the constitutionality of controversial Criminal
Code66 offences, abortion and assisted suicide respectively. In Rodriguez,
both the majority decision written by Sopinka J. and the dissent of
McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dube JJ. addressed this issue. In dissent,
McLachlin J. said:
Without defining the entire content of the phrase “principles of
fundamental justice”, it is sufficient for the purposes of this case to note
that a legislative scheme which limits the right of a person to deal with
her body as she chooses may violate the principles of fundamental
justice under section 7 of the Charter if the limit is arbitrary. A
particular limit will be arbitrary if it bears no relation to, or is
inconsistent with, the objective that lies behind the legislation. This was
the foundation of the decision of the majority of this Court in
Morgentaler ...67

Responding to this proposition, Sopinka J., who found no section 7
violation, also referred to Morgentaler and held:
Where the deprivation of the right in question does little or nothing to
enhance the state’s interest (whatever it may be), it seems to me that a
breach of fundamental justice will be made out, as the individual’s
rights will have been deprived for no valid purpose ... It follows that
before one can determine that a statutory provision is contrary to
fundamental justice, the relationship between the provision and the
state interest must be considered. One cannot conclude that a particular
limit is arbitrary because (in the words of my colleague, McLachlin J.
at pp. 619-20) “it bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the
objective that lies behind the legislation” without considering the state
interest and the societal concerns which it reflects.68

Justice McLachlin concluded that the distinction which the law draws
between suicide and assisted suicide, making one legal and the other a
criminal offence, rendered the legislative scheme arbitrary in violation of
section 7. An able-bodied person can legally take their own life but one
who is not physically able must enlist help to end their life, thereby
engaging an illegal act. In her view, no societal interest was offered
which could justify this distinction.
64
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Subsequently, in non-criminal cases, the concept of arbitrariness has
been given more attention, and more depth. In Chaoulli v. Quebec
(Attorney General),69 the Supreme Court was confronted with a complex
record, a controversial issue and a multi-layered constitutional analysis.
The issue was the constitutionality of the Quebec legislation prohibiting
private health-care delivery. Four justices held that the prohibition
violated the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms70 and three
(McLachlin C.J.C., Major and Bastarache JJ.) also held that it violated
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on arbitrariness grounds. The dissenting judgment, representing the views of Binnie,
LeBel and Fish JJ. rejected the finding of a section 7 violation arguing
that in so doing their colleagues had expanded the net of arbitrariness by
changing the test from “inconsistent” to “unnecessary”.71 Accordingly, on
the arbitrariness issue there is no clear majority. Moreover, an assessment
of the disagreement requires a careful parsing of the McLachlin C.J.C.
decision and an examination of the record to determine whether an
expansion actually occurred.
However, the discussions of “arbitrariness” are worthy of note. Chief
Justice McLachlin observed that a respondent to a claim of arbitrariness
must show more than a theoretical connection to the relevant state
objective, but must show a “real connection on the facts”.72 With respect
to the actual test, she said:
... whether the measure is arbitrary in the sense of bearing no real
relation to the goal and hence being manifestly unfair. The more
serious the impingement on the person’s liberty and security, the more
clear must be the connection.73

She observed that “common sense” arguments can amount to no more
than assertions of belief and, in order to defeat claims of arbitrariness, the
connection must be grounded in fact.74 Here, she proceeded to look at
evidence of the practises in other western democracies and concluded
that this refuted “the government’s theoretical contention that a prohibition on private insurance is linked to maintaining quality public health
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care”.75 For Binnie and LeBel JJ. (with Fish J. concurring) the test for
arbitrariness should be approached in three steps:
(i) what is the “state interest” to be protected?
(ii) what is the relationship between the “state interest” thus identified
and the prohibition against private health insurance?
(iii) have the appellants established that the prohibition bears no
relation to, or is inconsistent with, the state interest?76

This might be described as the narrow view of arbitrariness.
More recently, the concept of arbitrariness was relevant to the
unanimous 2011 decision of the Supreme Court in the Canada (Attorney
General) v. PHS Community Services Society case, commonly known as
the Insite case.77 Insite is a safe injection clinic where medical help is
provided to intravenous drug users. When it opened in 2003, it had an
exemption from the federal Minister of Health which insulated it from
the prohibitions in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.78 In 2008,
the Minister refused to renew the exemption. A number of constitutional
issues and arguments arose in this case. I will only look at the treatment
of arbitrariness as an element of the analysis under section 7 of the
Charter. Here, the Court needed to address the purposes of the CDSA and
held that they were twofold: the protection of public health and the
maintenance of public safety. Chief Justice McLachlin stated that the
“Minister cannot simply deny an application for a s. 56 exemption on the
basis of policy simpliciter; insofar as it affects Charter rights, his decision must accord with the principles of fundamental justice.79 The Court
accepted the trial judge’s findings that exempting Insite from the prohibition against possessing narcotics not only “does not undermine the
objectives of public health and safety, but furthers them”.80 In applying
the concept of arbitrariness, she concluded:
The jurisprudence on arbitrariness is not entirely settled. In Chaoulli,
three justices (per McLachlin C.J. and Major J.) preferred an approach
that asked whether a limit was “necessary” to further the state
objective: paras. 131-32. Conversely, three other justices (per Binnie
and LeBel JJ.), preferred to avoid the language of necessity and instead
75
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approved of the prior articulation of arbitrariness as where “[a]
deprivation of a right ... bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the
state interest that lies behind the legislation”: para. 232. It is
unnecessary to determine which approach should prevail, because the
government action at issue in this case qualifies as arbitrary under both
definitions.81

This statement is significant in two ways. First, it represents the views of
a unanimous court. Second, it leaves open for another day the resolution
of a divide on the basic conception of the arbitrariness test.
Another important arbitrariness decision was the 2012 Ontario Court
of Appeal decision in Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General)82 which
resulted in the holding that two prostitution-related offences in the
Criminal Code were unconstitutional. The case was heard by a five-judge
panel. All five found that sections 210 and 212(1)(j) were unconstitutional but the two dissenting judges would also have found section
213(1)(c) constitutionally invalid. Here, we are only interested in the
application of the arbitrariness concept. Quite appropriately, the majority
of the Court recognized that the section 7 jurisprudence dealing with the
distinct concepts of arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality is in an evolving state. The majority, noting that the “jurisprudence on
arbitrariness is not entirely settled”83 after Chaoulli, applied the conservative test and posed the basic question as follows:
When the court considers arbitrariness, it asks whether the challenged
law bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, its legislative objective.
Put another way, arbitrariness is established where a law deprives a
person of his or her section 7 rights for no valid purpose: Rodriguez, at
pp. 594-595.84

Using “inconsistency” as the test, the Court agreed with the lower court
decision of Himel J. that the bawdy house provisions could not be
characterized as arbitrary since they were directed to some legitimate
social harms and, accordingly, were consistent with the legislative
objectives.85 With respect to living off the avails, the Court concluded
that the provision was not arbitrary:
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In prohibiting persons from living on the earnings of prostitutes, the
legislation prevents the exploitation of prostitutes and, in particular,
prevents pimps from profiting from prostitution. The legislation may be
overbroad, a matter to which we will turn shortly, because it captures
activity that is not exploitative, but that is not the same as
arbitrariness.86

This thoughtful yet controversial decision, obviously headed to the
Supreme Court of Canada, permits us to make two observations about
arbitrariness. First, the Supreme Court jurisprudence compels a more
refined look at this important standard, especially in terms of distinguishing it from other related section 7 concepts. Second, like other section 7
arguments, in any case where it is raised, arbitrariness requires a thorough examination of legislative history, judicial interpretations and
appropriate social science evidence to properly understand the legislative
objectives which lie behind a statutory provision.
A different approach to arbitrariness, still relying on the same precedents, can be seen in the dissent of Binnie J. in C. (A.) v. Manitoba
(Director of Child and Family Services).87 The case involved a 15-yearold Jehovah’s Witness who had been taken into care after objecting to a
blood transfusion as part of her treatment for Crohn’s Disease. The
Director applied for a treatment order that would authorize the medical
procedure. The presiding judge invoked the statutory “best interests of
the child” test and granted the order. On appeal, it was argued that the
statutory scheme was unconstitutional since, if the child had been over
the age of 16, no treatment order could be made unless the child was
incapable of understanding relevant information or reasonably appreciating the foreseeable consequences of the consent decision. On the facts, it
seemed clear that the child had that capacity. The trial judge concluded
that capacity was irrelevant. The Court of Appeal considered that, while
relevant, it was not determinative of the “best interests of the child” test.
Sitting as a five-judge panel, Abella J. for the majority four justices held
that the legislative scheme created by the Child and Family Services
Act88 was “neither arbitrary, discriminatory, nor violative of religious
freedom”.89 After looking at the objectives of the legislation, the common law and other jurisdictions, she concluded that the scheme struck an
86
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“appropriate balance between achieving the legislative protective goal
while at the same time respecting the right of mature adolescents to
participate meaningfully in decisions relating to their medical treatment”.90
This balance “between autonomy and protection” ensured that the
scheme was not arbitrary.91 In a separate concurring opinion, McLachlin
C.J.C. and Rothstein J. held that age “in this context, is a reasonable
proxy for independence”.92 As a result, they concluded that the scheme
“reflects the societal reality of how children mature, and the dependence
of children under 16 on their parents, as well as the difficulty of carrying
out a comprehensive analysis of maturity and voluntariness ...”.93
In dissent, Binnie J. posed the questions differently by focusing on
the class of “mature minors”. His approach flows from his observation
about the applicable state interest:
Children may generally (and correctly) be assumed to lack the requisite
degree of capacity and maturity to make potentially life-defining
decisions. It is this lack of capacity and maturity that provides the state
with a legitimate interest in taking the decision-making power away
from the young person and vesting it in a judge under the CFSA.94

This led to his conclusion that “s. 25 of the CFSA is unconstitutional
because it prevents a person under 16 from establishing that she or he
understands the medical condition and the consequences of refusing
treatment, and should therefore have the right to refuse treatment
whether or not the applications judge considers such refusal to be in the
young person’s best interests”.95
After a long discussion of personal autonomy, Binnie J. returned to
the constitutional issue and characterized the legislative scheme as
creating an irrebuttable presumption of incapacity for a child under 16
for no valid state purpose. In his analysis, if “the legislative net is cast so
widely as to impose a legal disability on a class of people in respect of an
assumed developmental deficiency that demonstrably does not exist in
their case, it falls afoul of the ‘no valid purpose’ principle referred to by
Sopinka J. in Rodriguez”.96 On the arbitrariness point, he went back to
basic principles and reasoned:
90
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Arbitrariness is a breach of fundamental justice, and arises where a
law “bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the objective that lies
behind [it]”. The no valid state purpose principle requires the
identification of a public interest said to be advanced by the challenged
law. The no arbitrariness principle looks at what valid state interests
are said to be advanced and examines the relationship (if any) between
the state purpose(s) and the impugned measure.97

After quoting from Chaouilli, he rephrased his conclusion by explaining
that in the case at bar the irrebuttable presumption “when applied to
young persons of capacity has ‘no real relation’ to the legislative goal of
protecting children who lack such capacity” and, hence, is arbitrary.98
This illustrates the importance of understanding state interests not just in
theoretical terms but on the facts of the case, as the majority argued in
Chaouilli.
What is especially interesting about this approach is that it flowed
from Binnie J.’s argument that the presumption of incapacity cannot
legally be refuted. Whether he was right or wrong on this point, what
matters is that, in his appreciation of how the scheme operated, a person
is precluded from showing that, on the facts, the ostensible purpose of
the scheme does not apply. Here lies the similarity to mandatory minimum sentences. In a particular case, faced with a mandatory minimum
sentence, an offender is precluded from arguing that the ostensible
penological objectives have no relevance. In other words, the state
interest which ostensibly underpins a mandatory minimum sentence is
premised on a contextual presumption but the offender cannot show that
the presumption does not apply to her.

V. RECENT SENTENCING CASES, NUR AND SMICKLE
Both of these important 2011 trial level decisions paid attention to
section 12 and arbitrariness as an element of section 7. In R. v. Nur,99 the
accused pleaded guilty to the offence of carrying a loaded firearm which,
according to section 95(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, carried a mandatory minimum sentence of three years because the Crown proceeded by
indictment. Curiously, had the Crown proceeded summarily, section
95(2)(b) provided for a maximum sentence of one year. The sentencing
97
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scheme has a gap between one and three years and this gap was the focus
of various constitutional challenges under section 15 (equality), section
12 (cruel and unusual punishment) and section 7 (arbitrariness). The
discrimination claim under section 15, supported by the intervener
African Canadian Legal Clinic, may have been the most interesting and
refined argument, but Code J. dismissed it with the conclusion that the
“fundamental flaw in the s. 15 argument is that the Applicant and the
Intervener have not established that the discriminatory effect of overrepresentation and over-incarceration of blacks, amongst those charged
with s. 95 offences, is caused by the law itself.”100 Under section 12,
Code J. applied the Ferguson formulation, whether a punishment is “so
excessive as to outrage standards of decency” and disproportionate to the
extent that Canadians “would find the punishment abhorrent or intolerable”.101 Looking at the circumstances of the offender and the offence in
light of sentencing practises for gun-related offences, Code J. was not
persuaded that “gross disproportionality” could be sustained. At the
“reasonable hypothetical” stage of the analysis, a number of situations
were submitted all of which involved a “first offender of good character
who pleads guilty, who fully admits his mistake and who has no possible
criminal purpose associated with his possession”.102
Justice Code accepted the Crown’s argument that the answer to the
gross disproportionality claim premised on the “reasonable hypotheticals” was the availability of the summary conviction option which would
preclude the three-year mandatory minimum. He advanced a number of
reasons for this conclusion.103 However, he cautioned that if in the future,
“the Crown elects to proceed by indictment in a s. 95 case, based on
incomplete knowledge of the facts, and a very different case later
emerges at trial, a s. 12 Charter motion may well succeed at the sentencing stage of proceedings”.104
While the reasoning of Code J. on this point reflects his usual attention to detail and his scrupulous treatment of precedents, it is important
to pause and consider his conclusion. By saying that the hybrid nature of
the offence nullifies the hypothetical arguments is he not saying Crown
100
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discretion on the election question will usually do the right thing? Can
reliance on discretion, especially a discretion that is for the most part
unreviewable, ever be an answer? A similar point was argued by the
Crown in Smith, where it was submitted that facts that did not warrant a
seven-year minimum sentence would result in a prosecutor pursuing a
lesser charge. Justice Lamer rejected this argument by stating:
In my view the section cannot be salvaged by relying on the
discretion of the prosecution not to apply the law in those cases where,
in the opinion of the prosecution, its application would be a violation of
the Charter. To do so would be to disregard totally s. 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 which provides that any law which is
inconsistent with the Constitution is of no force or effect to the extent
of the inconsistency and the courts are duty bound to make that
pronouncement, not to delegate the avoidance of a violation to the
prosecution or to anyone else for that matter.105

While one might argue that Lamer J. in Smith was writing only for
himself and Dickson C.J.C., this would not be an accurate reading. Only
six justices participated in the Smith decision.106 In the three concurring
judgments,107 all justices agreed with Lamer J.’s conclusion that the
impugned provision violated section 12, including his reasoning on gross
disproportionality.108 Accordingly, it can fairly be said that a majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada has already rejected the use of prosecutorial discretion to rebut an alleged section 12 violation.
With respect to arbitrariness, Code J. described the claim as turning
“on the fact that there is a two year sentencing ‘gap’ between cases where
the Crown elects to proceed summarily (which carry a one year maximum sentence) and cases where the Crown elects to proceed by indictment (which carry a three year minimum sentence)”.109 In section 7
terms, the claim was that the Crown’s “discretion is arbitrarily constrained by the absence of sentences between one year and three years
which will force the Crown to elect to proceed by indictment in those
cases where, for example, two years would have been an appropriate
sentence”.110 To assess this claim, he relied on Rodriguez, R. v. Malmo105
106
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Levine,111 Chaoulli and A.C. v. Manitoba. As a result, he concluded that
there was “no valid legislative purpose” behind the two-year gap since
there inevitably will be cases in which the offender’s culpability falls
between the two options. He concluded:
... the two year “gap” is inconsistent with the true legislative purposes
that underlie s. 95. It severely restricts the flexibility of hybrid
procedures, it will inevitably lead to unfit sentences in the low and midrange of s. 95 cases, and it puts the three year mandatory minimum
sentence, when proceeding by indictment, at constitutional risk. These
are all irrational purposes and effects. There is simply no clear
connection between the legislative goals of the 2008 reforms and the
two year “gap” in the sentencing scheme. It appears to have been a
mere legislative oversight, which Parliament would quickly have
corrected by raising the summary conviction maximum sentence to
three years, had the oversight been pointed out.112

While the gap problem may be an anomaly, Code J.’s analysis shows the
importance of looking at a sentencing issue in terms of the overall goals
of a sentencing scheme. However, notwithstanding his finding of
arbitrariness, he denied a remedy on the basis that the constitutional
defect lay in section 95(2)(b) whereas Mr. Nur was sentenced under
section 95(2)(a)(i). While this is certainly correct, one might question
whether, after finding the gap to be arbitrary, it was appropriate to put the
blame on one end of the spectrum and not both. Every line has two ends
and if the line between one and three can be characterized as arbitrary
this is because of the gulf that the line spans and not just one of the end
points. Nevertheless, Nur is an example of section 7 “arbitrariness” in
action.
The decision of Malloy J. in R. v. Smickle113 has deservedly received
much attention for its careful reasoning and bold stance. The facts are
unusual. On the day in question, a group of police officers executed a
search warrant on the apartment of Mr. Smickle’s cousin by breaking in
the door with a battering ram. The warrant related to the cousin and
firearms allegations. When the police entered the apartment, instead of
the cousin, they found Mr. Smickle posing with a loaded handgun for a
webcam photograph that he posted on his Facebook page. He was
wearing boxer shorts, a white tank top and sunglasses. He dropped the
111
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gun and the laptop and was arrested. He was charged with various
offences in relation to possession of the handgun. Based on available
information, the Crown elected to proceed by indictment. At Smickle’s
trial, he denied possessing the firearm but, nonetheless, was convicted of
possession of a loaded firearm contrary to section 95(1) of the Criminal
Code, which carries with it a mandatory minimum sentence of three
years imprisonment for a first offence under section 95(2)(a). The
sentencing proceeded on the factual basis that Mr. Smickle’s use of the
gun was as a prop for his photograph which, along with the sunglasses,
would make him look “cool”. At the time of the offence, Smickle was 27
years old with no criminal record. He was employed and living in a
stable relationship with a woman. Like Nur, this case also implicated the
two-year gap created by section 95(2)(a) and (b). Counsel challenged the
constitutionality of section 95(2) on both section 12 and section 7
grounds.
Justice Malloy’s section 12 analysis represents one of the rare occasions in which a judge goes beyond the “cruel and unusual” platitudes
and delves into the deeper dimensions of the jurisprudence. She begins
by looking for those factors that have been recognized as relevant to the
analysis. From Smith, she finds (1) the gravity of the offence; (2) the
personal characteristics of the offender; (3) the particular circumstances
of the case; and (4) the actual effect of the punishment on the offender.
From Goltz, she adds (5) whether the punishment is necessary to achieve
a valid penal purpose; (6) whether it is founded on recognized sentencing
principles; (7) whether there exist valid alternatives to the punishment
imposed; and (8) whether a comparison with punishments imposed for
other crimes in the same jurisdiction reveals great disproportion.114 This
is followed by a curious statement: “It is not entirely clear whether the
‘grossly disproportionate’ test formulated in Smith was meant to create
an objective standard for cruel and unusual punishment in place of a
subjective test based on community values.”115 One would have thought
that any question of disproportionality, regardless of the degree, must be
measured by an objective standard. Nonetheless, while it may be difficult
to understand exactly what she means by using the objective/subjective
distinction, it is clear that she is attempting to come to grips with the
community standards concept which often appears as a synonym for
standards of decency. Perhaps she is suggesting that there are two routes
114
115

Id., at para. 39.
Id., at para. 42.

198

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d)

to gross disproportionality: one that looks to community standards (or
standards of decency) and the other in which the punishment is placed in
the lens of sentencing principles and practises? Ultimately, she accepts
the role of community standards but defines it in a way that integrates
both types of factors:
Notwithstanding these occasional references in the case law to
community standards of decency and what would shock the public
conscience, I remain of the view that the analysis of what constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment is essentially an objective test. To the
extent that community tolerance is part of that test, it can only be with
reference to a community fully informed about the philosophy,
principles and purposes of sentencing as set out in the Criminal Code,
the rights enshrined in the Charter, and the particular circumstances of
the case before the court.116

In so doing, Malloy J. has maintained jurisprudential consistency but also
refined the role of community standards or standards of decency in a way
that more meaningfully captures the sentencing question which, beyond
issues of torture and barbarism, section 12 must encompass.
After concluding that, absent the mandatory minimum sentence, a
one-year sentence would be fit and appropriate, she then examined the
three-year mandatory term from a perspective that integrated the accepted principles and objectives of sentencing. In the end, she concluded
that the mandatory minimum would be grossly disproportionate both
viewed through an “objective test” and whether the public conscience
would be shocked. She adopted the approach employed by Green J. in R.
v. Johnson117 and asked whether “a reasonable person knowing the
circumstances of this case, and the principles underlying both the Charter
and the general sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code, would
consider a three-year sentence to be fundamentally unfair, outrageous,
abhorrent and intolerable”.118 Following this approach was a significant
development. The reasonably informed standard, used in other legal
tests,119 is far superior to simply asking judges to imagine an artificial
public consensus.
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Id., at para. 47 (emphasis added).
[2011] O.J. No. 822, 268 C.C.C. (3d) 423 (Ont. C.J.).
Smickle, supra, note 2, at para. 89.
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Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1976] S.C.J. No. 118, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 (S.C.C.);
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It is informative to list the various factors which led to this conclusion:
•
•

•
•
•

•

The mandatory sentence would be 300 per cent greater than what is
appropriate.
A three-year sentence would put Mr. Smickle directly into the
federal penitentiary system, usually reserved for seasoned criminals.
These would be harsh conditions for anyone, but even more so for
an individual such as Mr. Smickle who had no familiarity or experience with the penal system.
The three-year sentence would jeopardize his personal relationships
and job prospects.
There was no issue of rehabilitation or individual deterrence.
The mandatory sentence does comply with recognized sentencing
principles but is inconsistent with many of the purposes and principles of sentencing, notably the goal of rehabilitation and the requirement that an individual not be deprived of his liberty if other
sanctions are available which satisfy the other goals of sentencing.
Even if it can be argued that general deterrence is served by the
mandatory sentence, this cannot justify the imposition of a sentence that is otherwise grossly disproportionate to what an offender
deserves.

Looking at this analysis, it is clear that Malloy J. has returned the section
12 issue to its proper home within the matrix of sentencing principles,
objectives and factors. This is more appropriate for the assessment of
mandatory minimum sentences especially those of relatively short
length, miles away from the extremes of life and indeterminate sentences
but also a considerable distance from a proportionate sentence. At the
same time, she has refined the role of “outraging standards of decency”
to ensure that it is reflective of informed observers who are knowledgeable about sentencing.
With respect to the arbitrariness issue, she agreed with the reasoning
of Code J. in Nur and concluded that “the mandatory minimum, when
coupled with the one year ceiling for summary conviction proceedings, is
arbitrary and violates Mr. Smickle’s rights under section 7 of the Charter.”120 The major distinction between Nur and Smickle is that in the
latter case there was no need to move to a “reasonable hypothetical”
analysis with all its intrinsic obstacles. Devoid of that distraction, Malloy
J. was able to re-invest the section 12 analysis with the gravity and
120
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richness that it deserves. One can only speculate about how her thoughtful reasoning will be received by other courts.

VI. CONCLUSION: ARBITRARY DISPROPORTIONALITY
From all of the section 12 jurisprudence, it is clear that a successful
claim must rise to the standard of “gross disproportionality”. The courts
have consistently said that simple disproportionality is a matter to be
rectified by appellate courts. However, this does not accommodate the
case of mandatory minimum sentences where both trial and appellate
judges are confronted with stipulated mandatory sentences which, in
their view, might be disproportionate to the culpability and circumstances
of the offender. Here is where the concept of an “irrebuttable presumption” discussed by Binnie J. in A.C. v. Manitoba121 strikes a chord and
leads to the concept of arbitrary disproportionality that may be encompassed by section 7.
Going back to Smith, let me address a comment by Lamer J. which
may be read as precluding this role for section 7. He said:
While section 7 sets out broad and general rights which often extend
over the same ground as other rights set out in the Charter, it cannot be
read so broadly as to render other rights nugatory. If section 7 were
found to impose greater restrictions on punishment than s. 12 — for
example by prohibiting punishments which were merely excessive — it
would entirely subsume s. 12 and render it otiose. For this reason, I
cannot find that s. 7 raises any rights or issues not already considered
under s. 12.122

First, as noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bedford,123 arbitrariness
was only recognized as a principle of fundamental justice in 1993 in
Rodriguez and, accordingly, earlier cases ought not to play a role in
understanding its application. Second, throughout Smith, Lamer J. was
concerned with the effects of punishment and disavowed the relevance of
looking to the legislative process. In subsequent years, especially with
the acceptance of arbitrariness, we have seen the recognition of the need
for a rational connection between purpose and effect when the right to life,
liberty and security of the person is engaged. Third, and most importantly, the argument I am trying to make is not simply about excessive or
121
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disproportionate punishments. It is about excessive or disproportionate
punishments compelled by arbitrary statutory provisions.
Essentially, the mandatory minimum sentence is an irrebuttable presumption. It mandates punishment on a presumption of culpability and
deservedness which cannot be refuted by reference to the actual circumstances of the offence and the offender. In a case like Smickle, where the
distance between a proportionate fit sentence and the mandatory minimum sentence can be characterized as “gross disproportionality”, section
12 comes into play. But is there no remedy where the distance is shorter?
Can courts be compelled to impose sentences which they know are not
appropriate unless they can meet the high threshold of “gross disproportionality”?
In these cases, I would argue that the mandatory minimum sentence
and the irrebuttable presumption that it implies should be subject to an
arbitrariness analysis under section 7 of the Charter. In other words, the
question ought to be whether the mandatory minimum sentence creates a
class of people who will be subjected to a sentence that cannot be
justified by any sentencing principle or objective. This requires looking
at the scope of conduct encompassed by the offence and then measuring
the lower limits of culpability against the ostensible sentencing principles
and objectives which underpin the legislation. I would return to Chaoulli
and the holding that a justification cannot be merely theoretical but must
be grounded in the facts of the case. It is not sufficient to simply refer to
deterrence or denunciation or incapacitation without showing how and
why they are relevant to a particular class of offenders. And here, the
methodology need not be encumbered by any question of a “reasonable
hypothetical”. So long as the legislated provision carves out a class of
people for whom the sentence cannot be justified on principled grounds
then the provision is arbitrary.
It is important to remember the approach of Lamer J. in Smith. What
needs to be done is to contemplate the range of conduct and culpability
which the offence encompasses. For every offence, it is inevitable that
there will be a young first offender. It is inevitable that an offence will be
committed at the lowest rung of culpability. The issue is whether, with
this class in mind, can the mandatory sentence be justified by reference
to accepted sentencing principles and penological objectives, as found in
fact and not by a speculative theoretical assertion. Under the rubric of
“arbitrary disproportionality”, it may be necessary to hear expert evidence about the scope and relevance of various sentencing and penologi-
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cal objectives. But this may be the only way to move from rhetoric to
fact.
Longer sentences simply for the sake of longer sentences are antithetical to the principles of fundamental justice. The inability of an
offender to argue on facts and principled grounds that a punishment is
undeserved does not conform with basic fairness which is intrinsic to our
common law tradition. Without a Charter concept like “arbitrary disproportionality” we not only place sentencing judges in difficult positions of
conscience, we also risk eroding public confidence in the criminal justice
system.

